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Abstract Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, allegedly denying motion, have been conceived to 
reinforce the Parmenidean vision of an immutable world. The aim of this article is to 
demonstrate that these famous logical paradoxes should be seen instead as paradoxes of 
immobility. From this new point of view, motion is therefore no longer logically problematic, 
while immobility is. This is convenient since it is easy to conceive that immobility can 
actually conceal motion, and thus the proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the senses” 
is much more credible than the reverse thesis supported by Parmenides. Moreover, this 
proposition is also supported by modern depiction of material bodies: the existence of a 
ceaseless random motion of atoms – the ‘thermal agitation’ – in the scope of contemporary 
atomic theory, can offer a rational explanation of this ‘illusion of immobility’. Our new 
approach to Zeno’s paradoxes therefore leads to presenting the novel concept of 
‘impermobility’, which we think is a more adequate description of physical reality. 
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“Zeno’s arguments about motion, which cause so much disquietude to those who try to 
solve the problems that they present, are four in number” wrote Aristotle approximately 
twenty-five centuries ago (Physics VI:9, 239b10)
1
.  
Nowadays, Zeno of Elea is best known for expressing four arguments against motion – 
usually titled ‘The Dichotomy’, ‘Achilles’, ‘The Arrow’ and ‘The Stadium’ – and classically 
mentioned as Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. Zeno was a Greek philosopher  and member of the 
Eleatic School founded by Parmenides (5
th
 century BC). According to Parmenides' 
philosophy, reality is one, immutable, and unchanging, and all plurality, change, and motion 
are mere illusions of the senses. As a zealous disciple, Zeno is believed to have written a book 
of paradoxes to defend Parmenides' philosophy. This book, however, has not survived, and 
what we know of his arguments against motion comes from Book VI of Physics by Aristotle 
(4
th
 century BC)
2
. In Physics, Aristotle gave his own arguments with the aim of explaining 
why “Zeno's reasoning is fallacious” (Physics VI:8, 239b5) and why “Zeno's argument makes 
a false assumption” (Physics VI:2, 233a22); therefore, he did not present Zeno’s arguments 
against motion as paradoxes. Aristotle's opinion was widely accepted until the end of the 19
th
 
century (Dowden 2017), when it started being questioned
3. This led to Zeno’s arguments 
finally being introduced as paradoxes. Since then, Zeno’s paradoxes have been the topic of 
several monographs, e.g., W.C. Salmon (1970), F.A. Shamsi (1973) and J.A. Faris (1996)
4
 in 
which extensive bibliographic references can be found. Over the last decades, they have been 
a regular subject of discussion in journals or books
5
 (see for example Harrison 1996; Papa-
Grimaldi 1996; Alper and Bridger 1997; Lynds 2003; Antonopoulos 2004; Hasper 2006; 
Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2008; Łukowski 2011; Laraudogoitia 2013; Reeder 2015; Ardourel 
2015). 
Since  Zeno’s paradoxes were first presented, many solutions for  them have been 
proposed, but none have succeeded in resolving all paradoxical aspects of Zeno’s arguments 
against motion: either the proposed solution solved one (or several) arguments however at 
least one was always left unsolved (the most recent example: Ardourel 2015), or the proposed 
solution led to other unsolved problems (for example, the “standard mathematical solution” 
leading to the supertask’s problem, see section IV.1). Another possibility is that the proposed 
solution simply did not lead to a consensus (Aristotle’s solution for example).  
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that Zeno’s reasoning relies on false assumptions. 
The demonstration is based on a new approach to Zeno’s  arguments, which consists in not 
seeing them as paradoxes of motion, but instead as paradoxes of immobility. From this new 
                                                          
1 In this article, all translations of Aristotle’s quotations come from R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1930). 
2 As an additional statement for ‘The Arrow’ argument (see section II), the sentence “But it moves neither in 
the place in which it is, nor in the place in which it is not” (by Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philos. 9, 72) can 
also be attributed to Zeno with the help of other primary sources (see Vlastos 1966). 
3 For example, Aristotle’s answer to ‘The Dichotomy’ argument (i.e. distinction between ‘infinite in respect 
of divisibility’ and ‘infinite in respect of their extremities’; Physics VI:2, 233a25) is considered as 
“philosophically unsatisfactory” by G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven (1957). 
4 These three monographs also treat the paradoxes of plurality (attributed to Zeno as well). The relation 
between the paradoxes of motion and those of plurality is discussed in detail in a recent article by P.S. 
Hasper (2006). The paradoxes of plurality are also described by N. Huggett (2010) and by B. Dowden 
(2017). The present article focuses only on the paradoxes of motion. 
5 This is true even without taking into account the intense literature about the problems derived from Zeno’s 
paradoxes (as, for example, the problem of the supertasks see section IV.1). 
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point of view, the concept of motion is no longer problematic, and the paradoxical aspect of 
Zeno’s arguments only relies on the concept of immobility. This permits us to disprove 
Zeno’s philosophy using his own arguments, by proving that immobility is a mere illusion of 
the senses. 
In the first four sections of this paper, the four arguments reported by Aristotle are 
presented and discussed in order to show that the logical structure of the paradoxes depends 
only on the concept of immobility. The last section is dedicated to showing that the 
proposition “immobility is mere illusion of the senses” is not only more easily acceptable than  
the Parmenidean reverse thesis, but it is also supported by modern depiction of material 
bodies: by the existence of thermal agitation of atoms in the scope of contemporary atomic 
theory, no physical object should be declared totally motionless
6
. 
It has been suggested that ‘Achilles’ and ‘The Dichotomy’ are designed to refute the 
doctrine that space and time are continuous (‘infinitely divisible system’), while the two other 
arguments are intended to refute the idea that space and time have an atomic/discrete structure 
(‘atomistic system’) (Kirk and Raven 1957; Owen 1957; Grünbaum 1967). These two 
different hypotheses about the physical nature of space and time will be mostly referred to as 
continuous framework or discrete
7
 framework in the rest of the paper. Since modern physics 
describes matter in terms of discrete entities (molecules, atoms and all its components) that 
are able to move in a continuous framework
8
, discussing the discrete framework may appear 
unnecessary. But we are convinced that the arguments of ‘The Arrow’ and ‘The Stadium’ are 
instructive in terms of the logical premises on which they are based and that they may yield to 
a better understanding of the two other arguments. This is why, in this article, the order of 
introduction of the four arguments against motion does not follow the one by Aristotle.  
The aim of the next four sections is systematic rather than historical: the original citations 
from Aristotle are examined in terms of logical issues in order to abstract the dialectical 
structure of Zeno’s arguments (English translation of the original texts is in italics in the 
following sections). 
  
                                                          
6 This conclusion is independent of the existence of any inertial frame of reference or of Galileo’s 
equivalence. 
7 In the entire paper, the word discrete is a synonym of ‘atomic’ and so, does not refer to any mathematical 
definition related to ℕ, the set of natural numbers. 
8 Even for quantum physics: quantum discontinuity applies only to energy levels (and to other quantum 
properties as the spin) of matter components (electrons, neutron, proton, quarks…) but not to space or time 
(see for example Grünbaum 1967; Grünbaum 1970). One of the cornerstones of the quantum theory is the 
Schrödinger equation, which is a partial differential equation where time and space coordinates are 
variables, and such an equation needs a continuous framework to be well defined. 
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I  The Stadium9 
The fourth argument is that concerning the two rows of bodies, each row being composed of 
an equal number of bodies of equal size, passing each other on a race-course as they proceed 
with equal velocity in opposite directions, the one row originally occupying the space 
between the goal and the middle point of the course and the other that between the middle 
and the starting-post. This, he [Zeno] thinks, involves the conclusion that the half a given 
time is equal to double that time. The fallacy of the reasoning lies in the assumption that a 
body occupies an equal time in passing with equal velocity a body that is in motion and a 
body of equal size that is at rest; which is false.  
[Aristotle, Physics VI:9 239b33- 240a8; Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1930)]  
(Aristotle’s explanation of the argument in fragments 240a8 to 240a19, see Appendix 1, for a 
reconstruction of his explanation) 
 
This argument against motion is probably the most difficult to understand directly from 
the text of Aristotle, and it is the least known and discussed among Zeno’s arguments. In his 
attempt to solve the paradox, Aristotle argued (cf. sentence in bold) that the velocity V B/A of a 
body B relative to a body A at rest, cannot be the same as the velocity VB/C of B relative to 
another body C, which is also in motion at speed VC/A with respect to A. This is trivial in a 
continuous framework since the notion of relative speed exists and we have the relation VB/A= 
VB/C + VC/A , which simply expresses the transitivity of Galilean relativity ; so, if VC/A≠0, then 
VB/A ≠ VB/C and Aristotle’s reasoning holds. But the notion of relative speed can be proved to 
be incompatible with the discrete framework. Thus, in this framework, the argument leads to 
the conclusion that, if A is at rest, then VB/C=0 and VB/A= VC/A= one ‘unit of speed’ (a 
thorough explanation is provided in Appendix 1). In others words, in a discrete framework, an 
absolute frame of reference must exist (the one of A), and only one velocity  is possible for 
any one body in motion with respect to this absolute frame of reference.
10
 This is in contrast 
with our everyday experience of motion. So, in the discrete framework, ‘The Stadium’ 
argument actually leads to a paradoxical situation, even if it does not deny the existence  of 
motion. 
It must be noted that, because the only basic assumption of ‘The Stadium’ argument is 
that space and time have an atomic/discrete structure,
11
 the only way to bypass the paradox is 
Aristotle’s solution (Physics VI:9 240a18): denying such an assumption and considering the 
reverse hypothesis, which is that space and time are infinitely divisible (the continuous 
framework). 
                                                          
9 Also sometimes called ‘The moving rows’ argument (see, for instance, Kirk and Raven 1957 or Dowden 
2017). 
10 According to E.W. Beth (1946), such a conclusion, not mentioned by Aristotle, is also included in a work 
of Diodorus Cronus (4th–3rd century BC), part of which was divulgated by Sextus Empiricus (160 – 210 
AD). The same conclusion is also directly attributed to Sextus by M.J. White (1982). 
11 It is possible to reach the same conclusion directly from the hypothesis of discretization of space and time 
(see, for example, chapter 5 of the monograph by J.A. Faris (1996)). 
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II  The Arrow 
(Part I) Zeno’s reasoning, however, is fallacious, when he says that (a) if everything when it 
occupies an equal space is at rest, and (b) if that which is in locomotion is always 
occupying such a space at any moment, (c) the flying arrow is therefore motionless. (d) This 
is false, for time is not composed of indivisible moments any more than any other magnitude 
is composed of indivisibles. 
(Part II) The third is that already given above, to the effect that the flying arrow is at rest, 
which result follows from the assumption that time is composed of moments: if this 
assumption is not granted, the conclusion will not follow. 
[Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b5 (for part I), 239b30 (for part II); Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. 
Gaye (1930)]. (Labels (a), (b), (c) and (d) are added to help further comments) 
 
Philologists are not all in agreement concerning the interpretation of Aristotle’s original 
text: does the Greek term ‘toi nun’ (translated above by ‘moments’) mean ‘atomic duration’ 
or ‘temporal point’ in the context of this argument?12 (Vlastos 1966; Faris 1996). In 
consequence, some authors explain ‘The Arrow’ argument in the discrete framework (see for 
instance, Kirk and Raven 1957; Owen 1957; Salmon 1970; Russell 1970; Faris 1996; Huggett 
2010), while many others comment on it in a continuous framework (see for instance, 
Bergson 1907;
13
 James 1911; Vlastos 1966; Lear 1981; White 1982; Faris 1996; Harrison 
1996; Smith 2003; Reeder 2015). Even if the interpretation of ‘The Arrow’ argument relies 
strongly on the choice of the spatial and temporal framework, we will now show below that 
both versions rely on an identical fallacious hypothesis. 
II.1  ‘The Arrow’ argument in the discrete framework:14 
In such a framework, the main argument (the sentences in bold) can be easily interpreted 
as: 
(a) → (ad) When a body occupies a defined and invariable number of indivisible elements of 
space, it is at rest. 
(b) → (bd) During any indivisible moment of time, a moving body occupies a defined and 
invariable number of indivisible elements of space.  
(c) → (cd1) Thus, during any indivisible moment of time, a moving body is at rest. 
   (cd2) Because the whole duration of motion is composed of indivisible moments of time,  
   (cd3) the moving body is at rest during the whole duration of its motion.  
                                                          
12 If the latter is chosen, it could seem redundant to refer to ‘indivisible temporal point’ in proposition (d). 
But according to G. Vlastos (1966), such odd terms (as indivisible point) are quite usual in Aristotle’s texts. 
13 But curiously, the ‘cinematographic vision of motion’ depicted by Bergson (in a continuous framework) is 
frequently used by other authors to describe the motion of the flying arrow in the discrete framework (see 
also footnote 17). 
14 According to Kirk and Raven (1957), the choice of the discrete framework permits us to get a consistent 
overall picture of the four arguments: for each space-time framework, one of the arguments leads to a 
paradoxical situation for the motion of a single body (‘The Dichotomy’ in the continuous framework and 
‘The Arrow’ in the discrete framework), while another one leads to a paradox when considering the relative 
motion of two bodies (the ‘Achilles’ in the continuous framework and ‘The Stadium’ in the discrete 
framework). So, if in each space-time framework the concept of motion is inconsistent, motion should be 
impossible. 
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Sentence (d) and Part (II) can be interpreted as: (ad) and (bd) are false because space and time 
are continuous – rejection of the discrete framework – thus (cd3) cannot be a valid conclusion. 
But, according to Aristotle (see Part II of the argument), (cd3) may hold in the discrete 
framework. Is this truly the case? Proposition (cd1), which concerns what happens during an 
indivisible moment of time, is deducted from premise (bd), which also concerns what happens 
during an indivisible moment of time, and from premise (ad), in which no temporal reference 
is given. But, actually, two other premises (ad+) and (bd+) need to be added to logically lead to 
proposition (cd1): 
(ad+) Premise (ad) is also true during an indivisible moment of time. 
(bd+) The number of elements of space occupied by a body is the same, whether being in 
motion or being at rest.
15
  
However, from (ad) plus (ad+) and from (bd) plus (bd+), we logically obtain a ‘proposition 
of indistinguishability’: during any indivisible moment of time, both a body in motion and a 
body at rest occupy a defined and invariable number of indivisible elements of space. So, why 
should we conclude that ‘the flying arrow is motionless’ (and therefore motion is impossible) 
rather than that ‘an arrow being at rest is therefore still in motion’ (and therefore immobility 
is illusory)? The answer is simply that, because there is no change in the spatial position 
during any indivisible moment of time, one tends to accept more easily the implicit premise 
(
i
p), rather than its opposite: 
(
i
p) The primordial category of being is ‘being in a state of rest’ and not ‘being in a state of 
motion’16. 
But, such a reasoning involving (
i
p) actually relies on the definitions of motion and 
immobility of the continuous framework and not on those of the discrete framework. Indeed, 
while defining immobility during any period of time as the ‘absence of change in spatial 
position during this period of time’ is sufficient in the continuous framework, an adequate 
definition for the discrete framework needs an additional specification about duration: the 
length of this period of time has to be strictly larger than the length of an indivisible moment 
of time. The reason for this specification is that: (1) as reminded by Aristotle, “our use of the 
phrase ‘being at rest’ also implies that the previous state of a thing is sti ll unaltered, not one 
point only but two at least being thus needed to determine its presence” (Physics VI:8, 
239a15), and (2) the counterparts of ‘temporal points’ from the continuous framework are 
‘indivisible moments of time’ in the discrete framework. Therefore, ‘being at rest’ cannot be 
defined during an indivisible moment of time
17
, so consequently, the hidden premise (ad+) is 
false. Premise (ad) could be corrected as follows: 
                                                          
15 Premise (bd+) may seem obvious but, historically, the hypothesis of a real length contraction of moving 
body was proposed by George Francis FitzGerald in 1889, and theorized by Hendrik Antoon Lorentz in 
1892, for accounting for the null-results of the famous Michelson–Morley experiment (1887). This 
hypothesis did not survive long; it had been forgotten by the time  of Albert Einstein’s view on relative 
motion (see the history and context of birth of the special theory of relativity for more details). 
16 These two expressions come from F. A. Shamsi (1973). 
17 Actually, the term ‘during an indivisible moment of time’ is not adequate as it assumes that some change 
could be performed during this period of time. But, by definition of the discrete framework, no change can 
occur ‘during an indivisible moment of time’. A more adequate term should be simply ‘at an indivisible 
moment of time’, but such a term was not used previously in order to retain the reader in the ‘classical’ 
fallacious reasoning. Note that describing motion as ‘a succession of rest’ or quoting the famous Bergson’s 
sentence “movement is made of immobilities” (the ‘cinematographic vision of motion’, see also footnote 13) 
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(a
’
d) When a body occupies a defined and invariable number of indivisible elements of space 
during at least two consecutive indivisible moments of time , it is at rest (during the 
corresponding number of indivisible moments of time).  
But (a
’
d) cannot be jointed with premises (bd) and (bd+) to lead to (cd1) anymore. Eventually, 
the illusory consistency of ‘The Arrow’ argument in the discrete framework relies on a 
definition of immobility illegally imported from the continuous framework. 
However, even if ‘The Arrow’ argument is invalided, the description of motion in the 
discrete framework is still troublesome. Let us consider two consecutive indivisible moments 
of time. For a body being at rest, the occupied indivisible elements of space are the same at 
two successive indivisible moments of time, while the elements of space occupied by a body 
in motion change. But, when should this change be performed since there is no time left 
between two consecutive indivisible moments of time? Changes cannot occur during any 
indivisible moment of time, and thus, they seem to occur out of time!
18
 This fact, combined 
with the true paradox of ‘The Stadium’ (see previous section I), seems suspicious enough to 
finally reject the hypothesis of an atomic structure for time and space (rejection of the 
discrete framework),
19
 as Aristotle did. 
II.2  ‘The Arrow’ argument in the continuous framework: 
In such a framework, the main argument (the sentences in bold) is actually more difficult 
to interpret in a consistent way than in the discrete framework, leading to various 
reconstructions of the argument in the literature.
20
 Here we present a new reconstruction that 
stays close to Aristotle’s text and is thus similar to the one proposed for the discrete 
framework. Our reconstruction falls within the framework of classical mechanics, and more 
specifically within the framework of the ‘mass point particle mechanics’, in which real-world 
bodies are modelled as point particles (with the help of the concept of ‘center of mass’) 21: 
(a) → (ac) When a body is at a determinate point in space, it is at rest.  
(b) → (bc) At any temporal point during its motion, a moving body is also located at a 
determinate point in space. 
(c) → (cc1) So, at any temporal point during its motion, a moving body is at rest. 
    (cc2) Because the whole duration of the motion is only composed of (an infinite number 
of) temporal points, 
    (cc3) the moving body is at rest during the whole duration of its motion. 
Sentence (d) and Part (II) can be interpreted as: Aristotle argues that (cc3) is not an admissible 
conclusion because premise (cc2) is supposed to be false. 
                                                                                                                                            
in the discrete framework is surely, but erroneously, assuming that the term 'being at rest' is defined at an 
indivisible moment of time. 
18 In such a context, the Diogenes Laertius’s sentence attributed to Zeno “But it moves neither in the place in 
which it is, nor in the place in which it is not” (see also footnote 2) appears much more understandable.  
19 This also rejects potential future forms of the standard quantum theory incorporating minimal distances 
(‘hodons’) and times (‘chronons’) (Grünbaum 1967). 
20 See, for instance, the very different reconstructions from James (1911), Lear (1981), Faris (1996), and 
Harrison (1996). 
21 See section V.4 for more details about some principles of classical mechanics. 
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Actually, whatever the soundness of premise (cc2),
22
 the intermediate conclusion (cc1) can 
already sound odd since “its motion becomes nothing but a sum of rests, for it exists not out 
of any point; and in the point, it doesn’t move” (James 1911). This is typically the 
‘cinematographic vision of motion’ described by Henri Bergson, for whom it is an “absurd 
proposition, that movement is made of immobilities” (Bergson 1907).23 Actually, such an 
absurd proposition logically arises from the implicit premise already mentioned in the 
previous section:  
(
i
p) The primordial state of being should be ‘being in a state of rest’ and not ‘being in a state 
of motion’.  
Once one accepts the fact that ‘to be at a point’ should primarily be a synonym of ‘to be at 
rest at this point’,24 one must accept proposition (ac). But because ‘being in motion’ is still a 
manner of ‘being’, which also requires a specific location in space, one must accept 
proposition (bc). In the frame of (
i
p), (ac) combined with (bc) leads logically to (cc1). But 
without (
i
p), (ac) combined with (bc) leads to another (obvious) conclusion: a body is at a 
determinate point in space whatever its state of motion. So, without the supposed ontological 
primacy of ‘being at rest’ upon ‘being in motion’  (i.e. rejection of premise (ip)), proposition 
(cc1) is false, and thus the paradoxical situation vanishes. 
In other words, the fact that a body can be at a determinate point in space at a ‘temporal 
point’ does not inform us about its state of motion, simply because “rest and motion are 
always in a period of time” (Physics VI:8, 239a21). However, modern kinematics (as a branch 
of classical mechanics) permits to describe motion of body not only during periods of time 
but also at specific durationless instants. To be able to do that, physicists use an additional 
parameter, called the ‘instantaneous velocity’ (speed at a ‘temporal point’), to fully 
cinematically describe the motion of a body. In articles and books that comment on ‘The 
Arrow’ argument (in the continuous framework), the notion of ‘instantaneous velocity’ is, 
almost systematically, introduced as the standard solution to the paradox. Indeed, it is an 
adequate answer because this concept permits to conceptualize motion at a ‘temporal point’  
(i.e. it is possible for a body to be both at a point and be moving), but it does not consist in the 
                                                          
22
 In the history of mathematics, questions about validity of premise (cc2) led to the ‘Metrical paradox of 
extension’, which can be briefly summarized by the following question: Does an extended line consist of 
unextended points? Actually, this questioning is much more related to the ‘paradox of infinite divisibility’ 
(one of the paradoxes of plurality) than to the paradoxes of motion; the metrical paradox of extension 
questions only the consistency of Cantor’s continuum in a mathematical framework: there is no notion of 
motion in such a framework. According A. Grünbaum, the problem is solved: “The set-theoretical analysis 
of the various issues raised or suggested by Zeno’s paradoxes of plurality has enabled me to give a 
consistent metrical account of an extended line segment as an aggregate of unextended points” (Grünbaum 
1967). Unfortunately, time is not a mathematical concept. So, the solution of this paradox does not really 
help to define an ontological nature for the concept of time. However, the solution permits, for practical 
purposes (e.g. in classical kinematics), that periods of time can be described in a consistent way as 
composed of temporal points. In a similar way, by shooting a picture with a digital camera, reality can be 
described with the help of colored pixels, but reality is not actually made of pixels. 
23 Bergson was not really interested in explaining why it is absurd. He simply used the paradox to support its 
pre-established philosophical positions (i.e. claiming that immediate experience and intuition are more 
significant than rationalism and science for understanding reality) (Tooley 1988). 
24 Such a synonymy is striking in Bergson’s comments: “Yes again, if the arrow, which is moving, ever 
coincides with a position, which is motionless” or “If it had been there, it would have been stopped there” 
(italics are added) (Bergson 1907). It is also found in Harrison’s interpretation of ‘The Arrow’ argument: 
“How can a particle be at a point and also be moving at that point?” (Harrison 1996). 
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real logical resolution of the paradox. Actually, the logical resolution is that using the notion 
of ‘instantaneous velocity’ (whatever its strict mathematical or physical definition)25 
implicitly rejects premise (
i
p). In other words, the philosophical statement underlying the 
notion of ‘instantaneous velocity’ is the following: the state of motion by default of a body is 
‘being in motion or being at rest’ (and not simply ‘being at rest’ anymore). 
 
In conclusion, ‘The Arrow’ argument (interpreted in the continuous or in the discrete 
framework) contains a circular reasoning:  the paradoxical facet of the argument relies on the 
fact that the primordial state of being is considered by Zeno to be ‘being at rest’ (= premise 
(
i
p)). But such a premise is a logical consequence of a stronger proposition stating that ‘being’ 
can be only ‘being at rest’. This proposition is logically equivalent to Parmenides’ position 
rejecting motion as real (see Fig. 1). 
 
 
  
                                                          
25 Current apparent philosophical problems raised by a specific definition of the ‘instantaneous velocity’ (see 
Arntzenius 2000, Carroll 2002, Smith 2003, Meyer 2003, Lange 2005) will be discussed in a forthcoming 
short article. 
 
 
Fig. 1 ‘The Arrow’ argument and Zeno’s circular reasoning. 
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III  The runners/ Achilles 
The second is the so-called ‘Achilles’, and it amounts to this, that (a) in a race the quickest 
runner can never overtake the slowest, (b) since the pursuer must first reach the point 
whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead.  (c) This argument is 
the same in principle as that depends on bisection [‘The Dichotomy’ argument, see next 
section], though it differs from it in that the spaces with which we successively have to deal 
are not divided into halves. (d) The result of the argument is that the slower is not overtaken: 
but it proceeds along the same lines as the bisection-argument […], so that the solution must 
be the same. 
[Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b15-239b25; Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1930)] 
(Labels (a), (b), (c) and (d) are added to help further comments) 
 
This argument (sentences (a) and (b) in bold) is called ‘Achilles’ according to the fact that 
Achilles, the swift warrior from Greek mythology, was chosen as a character in it. This 
argument requires a slower runner beginning to move some distance ahead of a faster runner; 
it is also frequently named ‘Achilles and the Tortoise’, even if the ‘tortoise’ is a later 
commentator’s addition. The argument suggests that the race will never be finished since, 
even if the distance separating the two competitors becomes increasingly small, it will never 
be equal to zero (see Fig. 2). 
Indeed, if r is the ratio of the 
velocity of Achilles (V) to the one of 
the ‘tortoise’ (v) (thus r = V/v > 1), 
and d is the initial distance between 
the two competitors, it can be easily 
shown that the distance still 
separating the two characters at each 
‘step’ (ln) is expressed by: 𝑙𝑛 = 𝑑/𝑟
𝑛  
(where 𝑙𝑛  never equals 0). From the 
point of view of the ‘tortoise’, it is at 
rest and Achilles is coming closer 
and closer to the (supposedly 
unattainable)
26
 goal, which is the 
moment/distance when/where he 
catches up with it.  
As remarked by Aristotle (in sentences (c) and (d)), this situation is identical to the one 
depicted in the progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument presented in the next 
section, and so the same (mathematical) ‘classical solution’ can be used here.27 
                                                          
26 We know from experimental evidence that Achilles will eventually overtake the ‘tortoise’. 
27 However, there also exists  a specific physical solution for the ‘Achilles’ argument: a runner will cover a 
finite distance in a finite number of steps, as noticed already by H. Bergson (1969), J.O. Wisdom (1970) and 
M. Kline (1980). By considering the itinerary of the runners in terms of steps (or more precisely in terms of 
jumps for Achilles and in terms of tiny steps for ‘the tortoise’), it is easy to identify the last step before 
Achilles overtakes: when the distance separating the two competitors becomes less than the length of 
Achilles’ jump + length of the tortoise’s step. Thus, the race will finish at Achilles’ next jump. To avoid 
such an obvious solution of the ‘runners-paradox’, it would be more judicious to exemplify the argument 
 
Fig. 2  The ‘Achilles and the Tortoise’ argument. 
d = initial distance between the two competitors; 
Example in which Achilles A is three times faster 
than the ‘tortoise’ T (r=3). 
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But, before trying to solve the paradox, we had better check the internal consistency of the 
argument: does the argument really deny motion? From sentence (b), we can conclude that 
Achilles can reach the initial starting point of the ‘tortoise’. But the initial distance d is not 
specified (e.g., it is not restricted to any values) and therefore Achilles is virtually able to 
reach any point of space. So, how can Zeno conclude from this premise that Achilles will not 
be able to catch the ‘tortoise’? Simply via a dialectic that would not put an illusionist to 
shame: his argumentation forces our attention to focus on a restricted region of space, in 
which the overtaking will never occur.
28
 Indeed, with sentence (b), Zeno strongly urges us to 
think repeatedly about the point where the ‘tortoise’ is located when Achilles performs his 
next step (see Fig. 2); and this point is always some (tiny) distance ahead from Achilles’ 
current position. But the overtaking of the ‘tortoise’ by Achilles will not occur at such a point: 
it will obviously occur at a point where, at the same time, both Achilles and the ‘tortoise’ are 
located. So, Zeno’s argumentation diverts our attention from the existence of such a meeting 
point… in order to conclude the non-existence of this point (in sentence (a))! So, the 
important hidden point that creates the illusion of a paradox is that the conclusion is actually 
not logically connected to the propositions of the argumentation (since sentence (b) tells us 
nothing about the meeting point). 
 
Also, there is again a kind of circular reasoning here: Zeno first assumes that the 
overtaking will not occur, confuses us with a pseudo-argument, and finally concludes that the 
overtaking will not occur. As Aristotle already noticed,
29
 it is easy to break the circle by 
asking the following question: ‘what distance does the tortoise travel when Achilles catches 
up to it?’ Resolving the equation d+v.t = V.t, we found that this distance is v.t= d/(r−1). For 
example, if Achilles is three times faster than the ‘tortoise’ (r=3), the ‘tortoise’ travels the 
distance d/2 at the end of the race (and so Achilles travels the distance 3d/2). The fact that 
Achilles needs to travel through an infinite number of points before reaching the ‘tortoise’ 
(that is simply a logical consequence of any motion considered in the continuous framework) 
does not impede the existence of the meeting point.
30
 Apparently, Zeno was a very good 
illusionist for making it disappear. 
                                                                                                                                            
with a sailing race: imagine two sailboats driven by a stable wind on a quiet sea. One of them has a sail five 
times larger than the other one, which is one mile ahead. The ‘sailboats-paradox’ is then expressed by 
replacing the word ‘runner’ by the word ‘sailboat’ in Aristotle’s original sentence. With this new illustration 
of the argument, we are faced with a more continuous motion, which is more in conformity with the 
continuous framework of space and time chosen to create the paradox. 
28 Obviously, the tricky point is that this region of space is nevertheless defined and limited by the point 
where the overtaking occurs (in the same manner that the open set [0,1) is defined by the number 1 but this 
number 1 is not part of the set). This is why Peijnenburg and Atkinson (2008) wrote that “Any difficulty we 
have with the Achilles lies in the concept of an open set [a,b)”. 
29 He wrote “but it [the slowest runner] is overtaken nevertheless if it is granted that it traverses the finite 
distance prescribed” (Physics VI:9, 239b28). 
30 Since, we repeated it, there is no logical connection between the proposition ‘space and time are 
continuous’ and the proposition ‘Achilles can/cannot catch the tortoise’. They are logically independent. 
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IV  The Dichotomy31 
The first asserts the non-existence of motion on the ground that which is in locomotion must 
arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal. 
[Aristotle, Physics VI:9, 239b11; Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (1930)] 
 
‘The Dichotomy’ is called as such because it uses an infinite sequence of halves or 
midpoints that can be identified in any line or distance using a repeated division by two. This 
is possible as we naturally place the argument in an “infinitely divisible system” for space 
(continuous framework). Not all commentators are in agreement concerning the interpretation 
of Aristotle’s original text, and it results in two versions of this paradox (see Fig. 3 below): 
- Progressive version: to reach the goal located at a specific distance, one must firstly 
travel half this distance, and then half the remaining distance, and again half of what 
remains, and so on. Thus, even if one gets closer to the destination, there is always some 
distance left: this distance is expressed by the formula: 𝑙𝑛 = 1/2
𝑛(where 𝑙𝑛  never equals 
0).
32
 Consequently, motion seems impossible due to the fact that the final point can never 
be reached. 
- Regressive version: before the second half of the distance can be covered, one must cover 
the first half. But before doing so, the first quarter must be completed. However, before 
this can be done, one must traverse the first eighth, and so on to infinitum. Consequently, 
motion seems impossible because it is not possible to get started. 
 
 
Fig. 3 The two versions of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument 
  
                                                          
31 In G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven’s book (1957) and in M.J. White’s article (1982), this argument is called 
‘The Stadium’! 
32 It is obviously the same formula as the one for the ‘Achilles’ argument presented in the previous section, 
with d=1 and r=2. 
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IV.1  Limits of the progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’: 
In the past, the regressive version of the argument was preferred to the progressive one 
(Hasper 2006; Blay 2010). But since the 19
th
 century, when the ‘standard mathematical 
resolution’ based on the convergence of power series was proposed (see below), the 
progressive version became more and more popular. Consequently, most of the contemporary 
essays by mathematicians evoking Zeno’s dichotomy argument claim that the problem is 
solved since the construction of the theory of infinite series in the 19
th
 century.
33
 Indeed, the 
progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument seems easily solvable since the overall 
distance travelled after n steps can be expressed as the partial sum of power series: 𝑫𝒏 =
∑ 𝟏 𝟐⁄ 𝒙𝒏𝒙=𝟏 . According to the theory of infinite series, all power series ∑ 1 𝑞
𝑥⁄𝒏𝒙=𝟏  with q >1 
are convergent and thus admit a sum. The formula of the sum for this geometric series is 
∑ 1 𝑞𝑥⁄∞𝒙=𝟏 = 1 (𝑞 − 1)⁄ . In the case of ‘The Dichotomy’, we have that ∑ 𝟏 𝟐⁄
𝒙∞
𝒙=𝟏 = 1. This 
mathematical result is generally considered as a solution to the paradox. 
However, such a formula does not consist in a logical resolution of the paradox since it 
consists only in a mathematical reformulation of the initial problem: by definition, the sum of 
an infinite series is the limit of its partial sums: ∑ 𝟏 𝟐⁄ 𝒙∞𝒙=𝟏 =  lim𝑛→∞ ∑ (𝟏 𝟐)⁄
𝒙𝑛
𝒙=𝟏 . It is 
useful here to recall the definition of a limit: we call L the limit of the sequence Dn if the 
following condition holds: for each real number ɛ > 0, there exists a natural number N such 
that, for every n>N, we have |Dn – L|< ɛ. In other words, the limit of a sequence is the value 
that the terms of a sequence ‘tend to’: the difference between the terms of the series and its 
limit can be as small as we want (we just have to use an appropriate large value of n ) … but it 
is never null (ɛ ≠ 0)! This is exactly the problem depicted by Zeno in ‘The Dichotomy’ 
argument in its progressive version (and in the ‘Achilles’ argument). Thus, this mathematical 
reformulation does not solve the paradox.
34
 
Actually, the progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument does not suggest that any 
motion needs an infinite time to be performed, but rather that an infinite number of acts have 
to be carried out in order to complete the motion. Thus, the following philosophical problem 
arises: how is it possible that an infinite number of acts can be performed within a finite 
interval of time? This problem is known as the problem of the ‘supertask’, a term coined by 
James Thomson (1954). A ‘supertask’ is defined as a quantifiably infinite number of 
operations that occur sequentially within a finite interval of time. The time needed to perform 
one operation is constantly decreasing (usually, the duration of the (n+1)
th
 operation is half of 
the duration of the previous one n). Thus, the total length of the ‘supertask’ can be expressed 
as an infinite sum. Obviously, the mathematical solution (the one stating that it is possible for 
inﬁnite series to converge to a ﬁnite number) ensures that the entire duration of the 
‘supertask’ has a finite value, but is not sufficient to ensure that one is able to complete it, 
mainly because there is no operation which can be identified as the last one (i.e. the one 
terminating the task). The question is now: Is a supertask (logically) possible? Such a 
                                                          
33 However, as one counter-example given by current mathematicians aware of the limit of calculus to solve 
the paradox, we can quote Joseph Mazur (2007): “I’ll show that while this may seem to be the case on the 
surface, the math in question—basic algebra—does nothing to address the underlying phenomeno-logical 
problem that the paradox drives at.” 
34 Note that the only useful information coming from the convergence of the infinite series depicted by Zeno 
is that the time needed to cross a finite distance is finite, but such information was already available from 
our usual experience of motion. 
Why Zeno's paradoxes of motion are actually about immobility.                                                  M. Bathfield 
 
14 
 
question
35
 is actually beyond the scope of this paper, mainly because motion, being “just one 
task performed in the physical world” (Romero 2014), cannot truly be considered as a 
supertask (contrary to Zeno’s suggestions).36 
Furthermore, because of the logical equivalence with the ‘Achilles’ argument, the internal 
consistency of ‘The Dichotomy’ arguments in its progressive version can also be questioned: 
it accepts the existence of motion (up until some specific points of the journey) to ultimately 
refute it just because the final point cannot be reached. This is why Maurice Caveing (1982) 
noted that, if a moving body can travel the first half-distance, what impedes it from running 
through the second one? So, he simply argued that, in order to have a truly paradoxical 
situation, “progression involves regression”. Indeed, the regressive version of ‘The 
Dichotomy’ argument seems much more convincing than the progressive one, and it leads to 
a true philosophical problem. 
IV.2  Philosophical problem of the regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’: 
Let us consider proposition (q): a body is moving in a straight line from point A to point 
B separated by a non-null distance. The regressive version of the argument states the 
following series of propositions (pi): (p1) before the second half of the distance AB can be 
covered, one must first cover the first half. (p2) But before doing so, the first quarter must be 
completed. (p3) Before this can be done, one must traverse the first eighth, and then p4, p5, 
p6… then so on to infinitum…. What can we conclude from this series of propositions (pi)? 
Actually nothing, because this infinite regression of the argument tells us nothing about what 
happens in point A. The classical conclusion (CC) is that ‘motion is impossible because it is 
not possible to get started’; such a conclusion is actually not logically connected to neither 
proposition (q) nor to the series of propositions (pi).
37
 Conclusion CC relies only on the 
primary hypothesis (h) that ‘the body is at rest in A’, which is not stated in proposition (q). If 
the body is already in motion in A, then ‘The Dichotomy’ argument is unable to impede its 
motion. So, it is only if one accepts hypothesis (h) that the argument leads to the incapacity to 
detect the very beginning of the motion. 
 
Actually, when interpreted in the general context of the ‘paradox of plurality’ (see 
footnote 4), A. Papa-Grimaldi (1996) argues that “the problem which was at the heart of 
Zeno’s formulation of his paradoxes is the impossibility to conceptualize the passage from 
One to Many”. Thus, in the present context, ‘The Dichotomy’ argument against motion 
                                                          
35 Note that there is no agreement in the philosophical community on the question, and the philosophical 
problem of the ‘supertask’ led to intense discussions in the literature. For example, four of the eleven articles 
compiled by W.C. Salmon (1970) about Zeno’s paradox are dedicated to this problem (“Tasks, Super-Tasks, 
and the Modern Eleatics” by P. Benacerraf; “Tasks and Super-Tasks” and “Comments on Professor 
Benacerraf’s Paper” by J. Thomson, and “Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes” by A. Grünbaum). 
Moreover, new articles or books dedicated to the problem are regularly published: some examples are 
Laraudogoitia 1996, Atkinson 2007, Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2008, Lee 2011, Romero 2014. A 
forthcoming short article will be specifically dedicated to this problem. 
36 This proposition (i.e. motion is not a supertask) would be very probably supported by Aristotle and by H. 
Bergson, since both authors claim (in their own style) that, even if motion can be potentially decomposed in 
an infinite number of parts, it is not actually composed of parts. 
37 It is the same logical fallacy noticed already for ‘The Achilles’ argument (see above in section III), and it 
was also already noticed by P. Benacerraf (1970).   
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enlightens the following philosophical problem (PP): How to conceptualize the passage from 
stillness to motion (or vice versa)?
38
 So, at the end, the regressive version of ‘The 
Dichotomy’ does nothing else than point out the insuperable difficulties to conceptualize the 
passage from immobility to motion, which basically comes from their respective ‘exclusive 
definition’; Each term is simply defined as the negation of the other one, and consequently 
being ‘half in motion’ or ‘half at rest’ does not make sense: “Vague expressions dominate 
natural language. Almost every expression of natural language, which does not have a 
mathematical sense, is vague. […] One can show that names such as ‘motion’, ‘rest’, ‘being’ 
and ‘non-being’ are precise (non-vague) terms of natural language” (Łukowski 2011). 
IV.3  Logical conclusion of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument: 39 
Being aware of the existence of the primary hypothesis (h) and of the philosophical 
problem (PP), it can be claimed that the logical conclusion of the regressive version of ‘The 
Dichotomy’ should be the following proposition (P1): ‘if a body is currently at rest, it will 
never move in the future’. This can also be expressed by the following contraposition (C1): ‘if 
a body is currently moving, it was never at rest in the past’.  Moreover, the ‘symmetry’ of the 
philosophical problem (PP) strongly suggests that proposition (P2) ‘if a body is currently 
moving, it will never stop moving in the future’ should also be valid; that leads to 
contraposition (C2): ‘if a body is currently at rest, it was never moving in the past’ . Then after 
combining (P1) + (C2) and (P2) + (C1), we can conclude with the following statement (LC): 
reality should be composed of ‘bodies being at rest’ with other ‘bodies being in motion’ 
where no bodies are able to change state. 
From ‘The Dichotomy’ argument, Zeno concluded that motion is impossib le, i.e. bodies 
should always be at rest. So, one can easily see that Zeno only reached half of the above 
logical conclusion (LC). This is due to the fact that he again assumed the implicit premise (
i
p) 
(already mentioned for ‘The Arrow’ argument, see section II: the primordial category of 
being should be the one of ‘being in a state of rest’ and not the one of ‘being in a state of 
motion’), and such a premise impeded him to consider propositions (P2) and (C1). Finally, 
Zeno engaged again in a circular reasoning (see Fig. 4 below). 
  
                                                          
38 European thinkers focused on such a philosophical aspect of Zeno’s paradoxes during the 18th century, 
and the regressive version of the argument was much more popular than the progressive version at that time 
(Blay 2010). But the problem is still considered intriguing nowadays: see, for instance, Medlin 1963, 
Hamblin 1969, Priest 1985, Mortensen 1985, Jackson and Pargetter 1988, Smith 1990, or the recent  book 
by Łukowski re-expressing the problem: “In any mental experiment, it is impossible to move imperceptibly 
from motion to rest or vice versa by some ‘small steps’. Moreover, it is difficult to know how those ‘small 
steps’ — leading us through intermediary states — should be understood. So, in contrast with various ‘hues’ 
of being a heap, bald or red, there are no ‘hues’ of being [in] motion. Either something is in motion or not” 
(Łukowski 2011).  
39 For each proposition or conclusion (concerning rest and motion) in this sub-section, the phrase ‘In a given 
frame of reference,…’ should be implicitly added. 
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Fig. 4 Zeno’s circular reasoning (within ‘The Dichotomy’ argument) involving paradoxical 
propositions and an unsolved philosophical problem (see also Fig. 1). 
 
 
An important concluding remark: it is worth noting that the only two arguments that 
pretend to deny the existence of motion (i.e. ‘The Arrow’ in both discrete and continuous 
framework, and the regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’), actually contain hidden and 
implicit premises about rest/stillness (see summary Table 1 below). 
Why Zeno's paradoxes of motion are actually about immobility.                                                                                                                                                   M. Bathfield 
 
17 
 
Table 1 Summary of the analysis of Zeno’s arguments considered as paradoxes of immobility 
 
Physical framework 
Discrete framework 
(Atomic structure for space and time) 
Continuous framework 
(Space and time are continuous) 
Argument The Stadium The Arrow Achilles 
The Dichotomy – 
progressive version 
The Dichotomy – 
regressive version 
See section I II.1 II.2 III IV.1 IV.2 
Implicit premise / 
remarks 
none 
Rest is defined during 
one indivisible moment 
of time 
Being = being primarily 
at rest 
none / 
arguments logically identical 
Before moving, a 
body is at rest 
Logical conclusion of 
the argument 
Only one speed 
is possible 
A moving body is at 
rest 
Motion is sum of rests Motion of a body cannot finish 
Motion of a body 
cannot start 
Strictly deny 
existence of motion? 
No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Observed physical 
situation 
Any speed 
seems possible 
Motion seems to exist 
Logical fallacy: no 
logical connection 
between initial 
propositions and 
final conclusion 
Same logical fallacy 
as the ‘Achilles’ (so 
‘progression 
involves 
regression’) 
 
Motion can start 
Paradoxical?* Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Solution (of the 
paradoxical situation) 
Rejection of the 
discrete 
framework 
Use an adequate 
definition of rest for the 
discrete framework 
Use of the notion of 
‘instantaneous velocity’ 
= Rejection of the 
implicit premise (to 
avoid circular 
reasoning, see Fig. 1) 
Rejection of the 
implicit premise 
(to avoid circular 
reasoning, 
See Fig. 4) 
Other remaining 
problems 
- 
Change occurs out of 
time! 
- 
Derived question: logical problem of the 
‘supertask’ (see section IV.1) 
Philosophical 
problem PP (see 
section IV.2) 
* i.e. is the logical conclusion of the argument in disagreement with the observed physical situation? If yes, it is considered as paradoxical. 
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V  Immobility as an illusion of the senses 
Roughly speaking, in the previous sections we saw that: 
1. In the discrete framework, while ‘The Stadium’ argument is truly paradoxical, the 
paradox of the ‘The Arrow’ can be overcome; but description of motion in such a 
framework is still problematic. So, to overcome these difficulties, we need to place 
ourselves in the continuous framework. 
2. In the continuous framework, two of Zeno’s arguments against motion (‘Achilles’ and the 
progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’) are logically inconsistent.  
3. The reasoning of ‘The Arrow’ argument and the regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ 
are valid but contain a circular reasoning (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 4 above).  
What we missed, as we were most likely distracted by the dialectic ‘tour de force’ of 
Zeno, is that only one of the four possible situations depicted in Table 2 (the first one) is 
considered by Zeno. 
Table 2 The four possible combinations of hypothesis about the physical status of motion and 
immobility. 
Case label 1 2 3 4 
Physical status of 
immobility 
Real Real Illusory Illusory 
Physical status of 
motion 
Illusory Real Illusory Real 
Corresponding 
philosophical 
position 
Parmenides’ 
philosophy 
Intuitive philosophy Solipsism 
Philosophy of 
ontological non-
immobility 
Being = being at 
rest 
Being = being at rest 
OR in motion 
The whole of 
reality is an 
illusion 
Being = being in 
motion 
Logical 
consequences 
Circular 
reasonings 
(see Fig. 1, and 
Fig. 4) 
Conclusion LC (see 
section IV.3) and 
philosophical problem 
PP (see section IV.2) 
Neither science 
nor philosophy of 
science possible 
Immobility = 
imperceptible motion 
(see section V.2) 
Compatible with 
physical experience? 
NO (Zeno’s 
paradoxes) 
NO 
(Not debated 
here) 
YES (thermal 
agitation, see section 
V.3) 
 
The second case could be seen as a ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ metaphysical position about 
immobility and motion. This possibility was already examined when proposing a logical 
conclusion of the regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ argument (see section IV.3), and it 
led to the conclusion: Reality should be composed of ‘bodies being at rest’ with other ‘bodies 
being in motion’ (where no bodies are able to change state). Like Zeno’s paradoxes, this is 
manifestly not in agreement with our physical experience of motion and rest.  Moreover, it is 
in this situation that the philosophical problem PP (How to conceptualize the passage from 
stillness to motion (or vice versa)?)
40
 is more prominent. 
                                                          
40 See section IV.2. 
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The third case is quite close to the philosophical position of ‘epistemological solipsism’: 
because all bodies are either in motion or at rest, if both notions of motion and rest are 
assumed illusory, the whole of reality is an illusion.  This case will not be examined further in 
this paper since we will see shortly that the fourth case permits us to stay in the frame of a 
‘philosophical realism’. 
The fourth case corresponds to a philosophical position that is the opposite of the one that 
Zeno and Parmenides defended, stating that only motion is possible in the real world. The 
next sub-sections will be devoted to showing that considering immobility as an illusion is 
much easier and more consistent with reality than supporting the Parmenidean reverse 
position, and that the philosophical problem PP vanishes in such a situation. 
V.1  A choice of philosophy 
According to Parmenides' philosophy, reality is one, immutable, and unchanging; and all 
plurality, change, and motion are mere illusions of the senses. A contemporary of Parmenides, 
Heraclitus of Ephesus, built a totally opposed vision of the world, known as the ‘philosophy 
of becoming’. One of the features of his philosophy that is particularly relevant for our 
purposes can be found in a text of Plato quoting Heraclitus: "All entities move and nothing 
remains still" (Plato, Cratylus 401 section d line 5). From a first glance at this sentence, we 
could believe that Heraclitus considered immobility as illusory. Let’s name this philosophical 
position the pseudo-Heraclitean philosophy (it corresponds obviously to the fourth case of 
Table 2). One could wonder if both philosophies are epistemologically equivalent: does the 
term ‘illusory’ refer to the same concept in Parmenides and pseudo-Heraclitean philosophies? 
The answer is negative. 
It is easy to conceive that a 3-dimensional material body, perceived as at rest, can actually 
be moving: examples of moving objects that appear to be at rest can be found in everyday life  
and can be caused, for example, by optic-geometrical effects and/or physiological limitations 
of our perception (see Appendix 2 for more details). In all these ordinary cases, illusion of 
immobility is easily explainable in a rational manner: there is really some movement, but it is 
imperceptible. In other words, because different magnitudes for motion exist, the illusion of 
immobility can be easily conceptually constructed from the concept of motion by invoking a 
magnitude that cannot be detected. 
On the other hand, there are no different magnitudes possible for immobility. So, at a 
conceptual level, can the illusion of motion be rationally constructed from the concept of 
immobility in Parmenides' philosophy? We do not think so. Moreover, more practically,  it is 
also very difficult to conceive that motion can conceal immobility: there is no example of an 
ordinary situation in which a 3-dimensional material body, perceived as in motion in a period 
of time by a specific observer, finally reveals to have been at rest during the same period of 
time (and with respect to the same observer).
41
 Thus, in Parmenides' philosophy, the illusions 
capable of concealing motion with immobility were probably ‘magical’ . This is not in 
contradiction with ancient times when divine entities were usually part of the philosophical 
                                                          
41 Of course, we do not consider here possible temporary troubles in perception and/or psychics that may 
cause hallucinations. Moreover, by specifying “3-dimensional material body”, we exclude here both the 
cases of some optical illusions, in which a still image seems to move, and digital videos/motion pictures, in 
which some tricks can be used to induce an illusion of motion. Both cases concern 2-dimensional pictures 
that are representations of reality rather than the reality itself. 
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principles of thinkers.
42
 So, Parmenides' philosophy seems consistent only in an ‘enchanted 
world’, while the pseudo-Heraclitean philosophy remains consistent in a more rational world, 
a world ‘disenchanted’ by modern science and philosophy. 
Actually, the pseudo-Heraclitean philosophy is not really faithful to the ‘philosophy of 
becoming’ since, according to A. Nehamas (2002), Heraclitus and Parmenides’ views have 
much more in common than is generally recognized. In particular, Heraclitus’ philosophy 
cannot be reduced to a philosophy simply opposing Parmenides’ views: it does not only focus 
on change and motion but it also focuses on what is stable and what remains identical in a 
constantly changing world.
43
 This predominant role of the concept of stability in the pre-
Socratic thought (and even perhaps in the subsequent Western thought) supports Henri 
Bergson’s view: “Of immobility alone does the intellect form a clear idea” (Bergson 1907). 
But Bergson’s assumption may no longer hold if we consider the possibility of a 
philosophical position that totally rejects the classical notion of immobility. This classical 
notion assumes (using modern kinematic concepts) that, in a frame of reference distinct from 
the body in question,
44
 the instantaneous velocity of a body can be strictly equal to zero 
during a non-null period of time ΔT (i.e. ∀ t ∊ ΔT, v(t) = 0,  so dv(t)/dt = 0). 
Here, we propose a new philosophical position rejecting the concept of ‘strict’ immobility 
as pertaining to reality assuming that, in any frame of reference distinct from a specified 
body, the instantaneous velocity of this body cannot be equal to zero during a non-null period 
of time ΔT (i.e. ∀ t ∊ ΔT, v(t) ≠ 0 OR if v(t) = 0 so dv(t)/dt ≠ 0)45. We call this new position 
the ‘philosophy of ontological non-immobility’. The logical consequence of this premise is 
that all bodies should be continuously in motion, which can sound very odd with respect to 
our ordinary usage of the terms ‘motion’ and ‘immobility’ to describe reality. This is why the 
embracement of the ‘philosophy of ontological non-immobility’ requires both a more 
consistent use
46
 for the word ‘immobility’ and the introduction of a new concept.  
V.2  The new concept of ‘impermobility’ 
The term ‘immobility’ (and all its synonyms: stillness, being at rest, being immobile, 
being motionless, being stationary, etc…) has always been supposed to be ontologically 
different to the terms ‘motion’ or ‘movement’: for instance, when F.A. Shamsi analyzed the 
                                                          
42 This is the case with Parmenides and Heraclitus. 
43 There are two quotations that support this idea: “All Presocratic thinkers were struck by the dominance of 
change in the world of our experience. Heraclitus was obviously no exception, indeed he probably expressed 
the universality of change more clearly than his predecessors; but for him it was the obverse idea of the 
measure inhering in change, the stability that persists through it, that was of vital importance” (Kirk and 
Raven 1957, italic is from the quotation), and “It is that some things stay the same only by changing. One 
kind of long-lasting material reality exists by virtue of constant turnover in its constituent matter. Here 
constancy and change are not opposed but inextricably connected” (Graham 2015). 
44 This specification of the frame of reference is important since, in the context of modern kinematics, any 
motion of any object can be cancelled by studying the system in the reference frame attached to this object; 
so using this arbitrary procedure, any object is by definition at rest (v = 0 and dv/dt = 0) in its own reference 
frame. 
45 I.e. the instantaneous velocity is, most of the time, not equal to strictly zero, but it can be equal to strictly 
zero at some durationless instants. 
46 We could argue that the current use of ‘immobility’ is not consistent since it induces problems as soon as 
we consider immobility as real: see first and second cases in Table 2. 
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philosophical consequences of Zeno’s paradox, he came to the conclusion that: “In the 
infinitely divisible system, there is a fundamental disjunction between ‘being in a state of 
motion’ and ‘being in a state of rest’.” Or in other words: “…it obliges us to postulate a 
special category of being, viz, being in a state of motion, which is in no way reducible to the 
other category, that of being in a state of rest” (Shamsi 1973). As we have already discussed 
in section IV.2, Zeno’s paradoxes do nothing else than point out the insuperable difficulty of 
conceptualizing the passage from immobility to motion or vice-versa (= philosophical 
problem PP), which basically comes from the respective ‘exclusive definitions’ of these two 
terms. 
But, if examined in the context of linguistic philosophy (i.e. philosophy of language  can 
help to solve philosophical problems),
47
 a solution for the philosophical problem PP can be 
easily pointed out: deny the ontological difference between immobility and motion by simply 
defining the former as an imperceptible form of the latter. Indeed, if with the word 
‘immobility’ we intend imperceptible motion, there would be only a change in spatial 
magnitude (and not a change from one ontological state to another) when something, being ‘at 
rest’, begins to move. In this context, a body at rest is not a body that does not move, but it is 
only a body that seems not to be moving. Obviously, radically changing the meaning of such 
a common word is probably the best way to produce both impenetrable propositions and 
misunderstanding. A better way to linguistically solve problem PP is to propose a new word 
to replace the word ‘immobility’ when describing reality. We thus introduce here the word 
‘impermobility’ (and its associated adjective ‘impermobile’) derived from the contraction of 
its definition: imperceptible mobility/motion/movement.
48
 
With the help of this new concept, problem PP (How to conceptualize the passage from 
immobility to motion (or vice versa)?) turns into PP’ (How to conceptualize the passage from 
impermobility to motion (or vice versa)?). Now, the answer to the latter problem has been 
given above by means of changes in magnitude of motion. Of course, it can be argued that 
problem PP is still unresolved. But by embracing the ‘philosophy of ontological non-
immobility’, this problem does not need to be solved anymore: is it really needed to 
conceptualize the passage from a concept that does not pertain to reality to another concept 
that is pertaining to reality? 
The notion of ‘immobility’ should not be seen as a concept intrinsic to reality but rather as 
a notion that emerges from our perception of the reality via human senses (sometimes by 
means of physical instruments). But, because both senses and observational technical devices 
are limited in their capacity of description (due to detection threshold, specific sensitivity and 
measurement variability), they cannot catch all types of motion that exist; so, the word 
‘immobility’ should refer more to a ‘weakness’ of our description of reality than to an actual 
feature of reality (considered as ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes in a 
context of ‘philosophical realism’). So, while the reality of the detection threshold and 
specific sensitivity (as a technical limitation of measurement devices) does not exclude the 
actual existence of strictly null magnitude, experimental measurements cannot offer any 
evidence of such an existence. And thus, from an experimentalist’s point of view, the new 
concept of ‘impermobility’     introduced to solve the logico-philosophical problem PP (see 
                                                          
47 Most of Zeno’s paradoxes of plurality (see footnote 4) are solved by an approach of linguistic philosophy. 
48 The terms ‘impermobility/impermobile’ can also be constructed by inserting the prefix ‘per’ — here 
meaning deviation or destruction — into the words ‘immobility/immobile’. 
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above)     may be more adequate than the term ‘immobility’ for the characterization of the 
kinematic state of material bodies. 
Therefore, the ‘philosophy of ontological non-immobility’ proposes the replacement of the 
two circular reasonings of Zeno depicted in Fig. 1 and in Fig. 4 by a consistent reasoning 
based on four logically equivalent propositions: “Being = being in motion”  “Immobility is 
not real”  “Immobility is illusion of the senses”  “The notion of ‘impermobility’ (= 
imperceptible motion) should be used to describe a body what seems not moving” (see Fig. 5 
next page). In such reasoning, there is no longer any paradox and, more importantly, the 
philosophical problem PP is solved. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Logical consequences (in the continuous framework) of a ‘philosophy of ontological non-
immobility’ compatible with the existence of thermal agitation: we have no paradoxical situation anymore 
and the philosophical problem is solved. 
 
Finally, the concept of ‘impermobility’ does nothing else than pointing out that ‘strict 
immobility’ is always an illusion of the senses, even for bodies where we cannot guess from 
our immediate experience that they are actually moving. So, to complete a rational vision of 
reality that should be in agreement with the ‘philosophy of ontological non-immobility’, we 
need to go beyond our immediate experience and immediate thought. According to G. 
Bachelard (1934), this is one of the principal aims of ‘modern science’. In the present case, 
current science provides us with a theory that is fully compatible with our new philosophy. 
Indeed, in the light of ‘thermal agitation’    one of the fundamental assumptions pertaining to 
modern atomic theory     immobility seems truly to be very hard to find in the microscopic 
behavior of material bodies, as we shall see in the next section. 
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V.3  Thermal agitation49 
As noticed already above, modern science describes matter in terms of discrete entities 
(atoms and all their components) but this matter is nevertheless able to move in a continuous 
space-time framework. The birth of the idea of atomism is usually attributed to Democritus 
and Leucippus (contemporaries of Zeno of Elea). But it was only during the 19
th
 century that 
diverse scientific fields of investigation such as chemistry, crystallography and 
thermodynamics (with the kinetic theory of gases) converged on the modern notion of atoms 
theorizing the existence of different atomic elements constituting all materials. A few 
historical milestones from this century should be mentioned: John Dalton built the first atomic 
theory in chemistry (1808); Robert Brown described for the first time (1827) the continuous 
jittery motion of particles inside grains of pollen (today denoted by Brownian motion); Albert 
Einstein published a paper explaining in detail how the motion that Brown had observed was 
a result of the particles being moved by individual water molecules (1905). In 1906, 
independently of Einstein, Marian Smoluchowski came to the same conclusion. This 
explanation of Brownian motion by thermal agitation served as a definitive confirmation that 
atoms and molecules actually exist, and was further verified experimentally by Jean Perrin in 
1908. 
Thermal agitation is the ceaseless random motion of atoms and molecules constituting 
matter. This motion is always present, whatever the state of matter (solid, liquid and gas), but 
it is faster and more energetic when the temperature is high. Theoretically, thermal motion is 
supposed to stop at the temperature of zero Kelvin (-273.15°C) because the thermal energy of 
matter vanishes (in the classical non-quantum interpretation). However, the laws of 
thermodynamics state that absolute zero cannot be reached using only thermodynamic means. 
This limit of temperature can thus be theoretically defined but it is practically unattainable. 
Consequently, every single atom and molecule of the universe is ceaselessly moving. 
Obviously, the spatial magnitude of this thermal motion is so tiny that it cannot be directly 
perceived by our senses or by any optical microscope. Only some physical processes can 
indirectly reveal the existence of thermal motion. Historically, Brownian motion was the first 
evidence for thermal motion, but the much more common (non-convective) diffusion process 
in fluids (liquids or gases) offers another indirect proof of it. For example, a glass of water 
into which an ink drop is added will spontaneously (without mixing) homogenize: the 
diffusion of the ink molecules in the entire volume of water is driven by thermal agitation. 
Seeing this homogenization process, we easily conceive that the ink molecules can freely 
travel within the space delimited by the glass of water. Actually, the movement of molecules 
continues after the homogenization and occurred before adding the ink, but at these instants 
there is no visual effect of thermal agitation. In the solid state, atoms and molecules are not 
free to move around everywhere within the volume of the solid. Indeed, solids do not deform 
spontaneously. But thermal agitation exists in the form of vibrating oscillation of the a toms 
around equilibrium points. This is the foundation of the theory of thermal conduction in 
solids: for an electrically non-conducting solid, heat conduction is attributed to atomic 
activity in the form of lattice vibration. Moreover, within a molecule (and independently of 
the state of matter), atoms constituting the molecule are subject to vibrational oscillations; in 
                                                          
49 This sub-section does not contain any bibliographic references since it exposes only encyclopedic 
knowledge, which is not subject to debate in the scientific community. 
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the context of analytical chemistry, some spectroscopy techniques    like infrared and Raman 
spectroscopy    are specially based on the existence of such a vibrational motion of atoms 
within the molecules.
50
  
It is worth noting that thermal agitation is immune from Zeno’s paradoxes: the two 
consistent arguments against motion in the continuous framework are ‘The Arrow’ and the 
regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ (see Table 1), but their consistency is circular and 
needs introducing to the notion of immobility (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 4). Now, this notion is not 
needed when defining thermal agitation, where all atoms or molecules are really ceaselessly 
moving in a temporally infinite motion (i.e. without any conceivable beginning or ending in 
time). 
Next, a recall about how classical mechanics describes motion is the final step to 
rationally understanding how thermal agitation (a microscopic-scale phenomenon) can affect 
the state of motion of a macroscopic material body. 
V.4  Motion in classical mechanics 
Kinematics is the branch of classical mechanics that describes the motion of points, 
bodies (objects) and systems of bodies (groups of objects), without questioning the causes of 
motion. Put simply, classical mechanics often models real-world objects as point particles, i.e. 
objects with negligible size. The motion of a point particle is characterized by a small number 
of parameters: its position, mass, and the forces applied to it. In reality, the kinds of objects 
that classical mechanics describes always have a non-zero size. However, the results for point 
particles can be used to study such objects by treating them as composite objects, made up of 
a large number of interacting point particles. Indeed, the center of mass of a composite object 
behaves like a point particle: the center of mass (or barycenter) of a distribution of mass in 
space is defined as the unique point where the weighted relative position of the distributed 
mass sums to zero. The distribution of mass is balanced around the center of mass and the 
average of the weighted position coordinates of the distributed mass defines its coordinates. 
Calculations in mechanics are often simplified when formulated with respect to the center of 
mass. In the case of a system of N particles Pi (i = 1, …, N), each with mass mi located in 
space with coordinates ri (i = 1, …, N), the coordinates R of the center of mass satisfy the 
condition: ∑ mi .
N
i=1 (ri-R)=0. Solving this equation for R, we obtain the formula: 
R=
1
M
∑ mi .ri
N
i=1 , where M is the sum of the masses of all of the particles. The center of mass 
being only a mathematical point in space, is a ‘point representing a physical object’ just like 
the one that Zeno actually used in his arguments. 
Considering that each solid body is composed of atoms and that these atoms are 
ceaselessly vibrating (random fluctuations), the center of mass of the object is also vibrating. 
Obviously, because of statistical compensation during the addition of the random fluctuations, 
the amplitude of motion of the center of mass is several orders of magnitude lower than the 
one of an individual atom. Actually, regardless of the real physical magnitude (10
-20
, 10
-50
 or 
10
-500 
m, no matter), the important fact is that, even if extremely small, this spatial amplitude 
is never strictly null (during a non-null period of time). Furthermore, the non-
                                                          
50 As an example of academic reference see Sherwood (1972). Generally, the existence of ‘atomic and/or 
molecular dynamics’ is part of the current scientific paradigm of most chemists. For them, the proposed 
‘philosophy of ontological non-immobility’ will probably appear quite obvious and natural. 
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perception/detection of motion does not always involve slow motions, since fast motions 
restricted in tiny spatial domains can also be imperceptible or undetectable. So,  the 
instantaneous velocity of the center of mass does not need to be extremely low to restrict its 
motion within an extremely tiny area: the velocity vector just needs to ceaselessly change 
direction (and optionally change magnitude) in a random manner; and the feature of being 
random is exactly an essential part of the definition of thermal agitation.  
Finally, the existence of thermal agitation can act as a physical and rational assistance for 
the proposed conceptual change: replacement of the word ‘immobility’ by the new concept of 
‘impermobility’ when describing the kinematic state of any material body. While there is, by 
definition, an ontological difference between motion and immobility, there is no ontological 
difference between motion and ‘impermobility’. The difference is only in the order of 
magnitude of the two kinds of motion; this difference is obviously very large (probably a 
large gap of 15 to 20 orders of magnitude) between the motion of the center of mass of an 
‘impermobile’ object and the discernible macroscopic motion of the same object.51 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we showed that, among Zeno’s arguments against motion reported by 
Aristotle, only ‘The Stadium’ argument is truly paradoxical. But, since this paradox only 
concerns the discrete framework (atomic structure for time and space), the solution is simply 
to reject such a framework in favor of the continuous framework (an infinitely divisible 
system for time and space).  We also showed that, in the latter framework, the ‘Achilles’ and 
the progressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’ arguments are logically equivalent but they fail 
to deny motion because of their internal inconsistency. Additionally, we proved that 
consistent arguments can be found in ‘The Arrow’ and in the regressive version of ‘The 
Dichotomy’, but their consistency relies on a hidden premise (the primordial state of being is 
‘being in a state of rest’ and not ‘being in a state of motion’) leading to a circular reasoning. 
Finally, we showed why Zeno’s arguments against motion should be seen as paradoxes of 
immobility. In such a kind of paradox, motion is logically paradoxical because immobility is 
at first supposed to exist. Thus, trying to identify logical issues in Zeno’s arguments in order 
to solve the paradoxes is not necessary anymore, since simply denying that ‘immobility is 
pertaining to reality’ protects the concept of motion from any logical problems. 
In fact, Zeno’s arguments simply illustrate the unresolved logico-philosophical problem 
PP consisting in attempting to conceptualize the passage from stillness to motion (or vice 
versa). The circularity of the arguments highlights both the strength and weaknesses of 
Zeno’s dialectic: his argumentations are very convincing when considered in the context of a 
Parmenidean vision of the world because they are fully consistent within it, but they are also 
weak since they cannot resist opposite philosophical positions. In particular, the ‘philosophy 
of ontological non-immobility’ introduced in this paper — in which the new concept of 
‘impermobility’ (simply meaning imperceptible motion) replace the word immobility (and all 
its synonyms) when describing reality — is immune from Zeno’s paradoxes. According to 
such a philosophy, immobility is merely an illusion of the senses, and reality includes only 
                                                          
51 Both motions are considered in the same reference frame, but both the reality and the conceptualization of 
thermal agitation are actually not dependent on the specification of any Galilean reference frame. 
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motion. The main advantages of this philosophical position are: (1) the self-evident resolution 
of the above-mentioned philosophical problem PP, (2) a complete compatibility with the 
description of material bodies depicted by modern science (by the mean of thermal agitation 
and kinematics). The undeniable non-intuitive aspect is perhaps its only minor drawback. 
After all, the current situation related to the consistency of some of Zeno’s arguments 
(‘The Arrow’ and the regressive version of ‘The Dichotomy’) still offers us the following 
‘personal’ choice: (1) If you think that immobility must exist in the real world, you must 
logically accept that motion is an illusion; otherwise you are stuck into a paradoxical 
situation; (2) If you think that immobility does not exist in the real world, there is no problem 
to consider motion as real anymore, and the above-mentioned logico-philosophical PP 
problem is solved. Actually, by the mere fact that such a choice exists, it reveals an important 
epistemological conclusion: the real existence of immobility (i.e. as being more than a 
human-imagined concept) should be considered as an a priori belief for which we may search 
some experimental evidences. Contemporary science strongly suggests that there are no such 
evidences, but it does not impede anybody from looking after them.  
Finally, the present article does not pretend to exhaust all philosophical aspects or 
epistemological consequences of this new vision of Zeno’s paradoxes, and it should  rather be 
seen as a new starting point to continue the long debate about the nature of motion and 
stillness. In particular, since classical notion of immobility is based on our immediate 
experience and since immediate experience is one of the ‘epistemological obstacles’ 
identified by Gaston Bachelard,
52
 we can legitimately wonder: should the notion of 
immobility also be a stealthy ‘epistemological obstacle’? If yes, we hope that the present 
article will be of help in overcoming it. 
                                                          
52 According to G. Bachelard (1934), epistemological obstacles are all representations that are blocking or 
hindering scientific progress. 
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Appendix 1: Explanation of ‘The Stadium’ argument 
Because this explanation is largely inspired from the one of J.A. Faris (1996), the 
translation of Aristotle ‘s text by this author is given below: 
(Part I) The fourth is the one about the two equal rows of bodies that move past each other in 
opposite directions at equal speeds, the one row from the end of the stadium, the other from 
the mid-point; in this argument Zeno thinks it follows that the half of a given time is equal to 
its double. 
(Part II) For example, let AA be the stationary bodies, BB those, equal to these in size and 
number, starting from the mid-point, and CC those starting from the end, equal in size and 
number to the As and in speed to the Bs. 
[Aristotle, Physics VI:239b33-240a1 (for part I); 240a4-240a18 (for part II) ; Translated by J.A. Faris 
(1996)] 
 
The fourth argument against motion is probably the most difficult to understand directly 
from the text of Aristotle. Like the ‘Arrow’ argument, a discrete space and time framework 
have to be used to correctly interpret it… but it is still not obvious to see how Zeno attains the 
strange conclusion “the half of a given time is equal to its double”. One explanation to get to 
the same paradoxical conclusion that Zeno propounded is the following:  
(a) The first B in the time of its movement has passed 1 A (e.g. B3 was in front of A2 in 
the initial position and is in front of A3 in the final position, see Fig. 6). 
(b) The first C in the time of its movement has passed 2 B’s (e.g. C1 passes B2 and B3). 
(c) The time taken by the first C to pass a B = the time taken by the first B to pass an A.  
(d) The first C in the time of its movement has also passed 1 A (C1 was in front of A2 in 
the initial position and is in front of A1 in the final position). 
Therefore: 
From a,b,c: The first B’s time = half the first C’s time (1). 
But, from a,d: The first B’s time = the first C’s time (2). 
Therefore, from (1) and (2): Half the first C’s time = the first C’s time (i.e. half of a given 
time is equal to the whole). 
 
Fig. 6 Schematic representation of ‘The Stadium’ argument (when the cardinality of each group is 3) 
(Moments t and t’ are two consecutive indivisible moments of time) 
The corner stone of Zeno’s argumentation is obviously proposition (c). Indeed, this one 
can seem quite dubious at first glance, and it would be more natural to state the following:  
the time taken by the first C to pass a B = half the time taken by the first B to pass an A. But 
such a proposition is a true proposition only in a ‘continuous world’: the Stadium argument is 
trivial in a continuous framework, as the notion of relative speed exists; unfortunately, it is 
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not valid in a discrete space and time framework in which intermediate positions are not 
allowed (see Fig. 7). Thus, proposition (c) is a direct consequence of discretization of time 
and space. 
 
Fig. 7 Non-existing position in a discrete space and time framework 
As noticed already by Adolf Grünbaum (1967, 1970), another way to run into a paradox is 
to consider the same maneuver but in the reference frame of the B’s instead of the reference 
frame of the A’s: in this case, the A’s and the C’s are moving in the same direction, and 
problems occur when considering the speed of these rows. Of course, the A’s are moving at 
the Bs’ previous rate, but what is the speed of the C’s now? Let’s suppose that we find 
ourselves looking again at the rows all in the same position (i.e. final position of Fig. 6) but in 
this case, C1 goes to B1 from B3 without ever passing in front of B2 (remember that there is no 
time left between two consecutive indivisible moments of time). So, C1 should perform a kind 
of teleportation! To avoid that, C1 should be in front of B2 after this motion… but in this case, 
we can remark that the row of C’s is now moving at the same rate as the A’s i.e. it is not 
moving any faster  than the A’s (see Fig. 8). 
 
Fig. 8 Schematic representation of ‘The Stadium’ argument in the reference frame of the B’s 
(Moments t and t’ are two consecutive indivisible moments of time) 
 
Finally, the argument reveals that the hypothesis of an atomic structure of space and time 
implies automatically that firstly, an absolute reference frame must exist (in the ‘The 
Stadium’ argument, this absolute reference frame is of course the A row) and secondly, in this 
absolute reference frame, motion can be carried out at only one speed (change of only 1 
element of space between two consecutive indivisible moments of time). The huge problem is 
that such a situation does not allow the existence of relative motion at any specific speed. So, 
‘The Stadium’ argument does not explicitly ban the existence of motion but forbids the 
existence of relative motion. Of course, such a forbidding remains in discrepancy with ou r 
classical physical experience, so the paradoxical situation remains (in the discrete 
framework).  
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Appendix 2: Common situations in which movement is not perceived 
Because it is so usual to experience movement in everyday life, we generally do not 
realize that such a perception of motion requires four conditions, which are depicted in  
Fig. 9. In a given inertial frame, where an object is physically in motion, the lack of one 
of these conditions does frequently induce an illusion of immobility (in the same Galilean 
reference frame). 
 
Fig. 9 Schematic representation of the four requirements needed for the perception (by human or 
animal) or the detection (by any instrument) of motion 
 
One of the simplest examples of such an illusion is the motion of the sun during a very 
sunny day. When looking at the sun in a perfect blue sky (without any clouds) for a few 
minutes around noon, one may have the impression that the sun is not moving. But if one 
stays in the sun, motionless, near a tree and a few minutes later, is in the shadow of the tree, 
one can easily infer that the sun is moving. In this case, thanks to the tree used as a reference 
frame, motion can be quickly/easily detected. Without this (local) reference frame, we can 
still define the position of the sun according to its elevation above the horizon, but without 
any measurement device to precisely record the azimuth value, we would generally need a 
few hours to detect actual changes in its position (and if you are less hurried and prepared to 
extend the duration of observation, waiting for sunset is obviously also evidence of the 
apparent movement of the sun). So, depending on presence (or absence) of a reference frame, 
and on relative speed of the motion, the minimum duration of the observation has to be 
adjusted to correctly perceive the movement and avoid the illusion of sti llness. 
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  Moreover, the detection of motion always implies a comparison of two different 
positions at two different times. This operation of comparison requires having recorded the 
first position to memory (brain for animals or a specific device for machines).
53
 Such an 
operation is extremely natural for most people but, unfortunately, not for people affected by 
akinetopsia (motion blindness). Patients with akinetopsia cannot perceive motion in their 
visual field, despite being able to see stationary objects. For them, the world is devoid of 
motion. Even for healthy people, physiological limits of vision can induce illusion of 
immobility: as the ‘normal’ visual acuity is around 1 arcminute (1’ = 1/60°), any movement 
of 9 m of spatial largeness cannot be detected if observed from more than 30 km. Moreover, 
direction of motion in comparison to the axis of observation could also affect the perception 
of actual motion: let us imagine someone on a beach, bordered by a coast where a lighthouse 
is located. At a distance of 3000 m there is a 15 m-high sailing boat travelling at 10 knots 
(~5.1 m.s
-1
) towards the lighthouse (see Fig. 10). For the observer, the boat travels at 5.9 ’.s-1 
and consequently the observer can detect the motion of the boat in less than one second. In 
this motion the lighthouse acts as local 
reference frame and its apparent distance 
from the sailing boat is decreasing quite 
quickly; but if the boat faces the observer, 
the apparent distance between the 
lighthouse and the boat does not change so 
rapidly anymore. Only changes in the 
apparent size (or angular diameter) of the 
boat can give an indication of the actual 
movement. With the considered 
configuration (see Fig. 10), a modification 
of this apparent size of more than 1’ is 
performed after 32 s. Before this time 
elapses, the observer has the illusion that 
the moving boat is actually still. 
Physiological limitations of human 
eyes not only restrict the vision of remote 
objects but also that of close ones. The 
least distance of distinct vision is the 
smallest distance at which someone with 
‘normal’ vision can comfortably look at 
something. This distance is typically about 
25 cm for a ‘normal’ subject. Combined 
with the value of ‘normal’ visual acuity, 
this means that we cannot directly see 
something smaller than ~0.07 mm. However, motion on a microscopic scale exists and 
anybody can use a microscope to be convinced of that.  
Thus, in some common situations, it is easy to be persuaded that stillness is illusory and 
optico-geometrical effects can mask actual motion. 
                                                          
53 This is in agreement with Michael Tooley’s view: “For it seems to me that perceptual knowledge that 
something is moving involves unconscious use of short-term memory” (Tooley 1988). 
 
 
 
Fig. 10 Schematic representation of an 
example of geometric effect on the duration of 
observation to be able to perceive motion. 
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